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How Does Knowledge of the AUC Constrain the Set
of Possible Ground-truth Labelings?
Abstract
Recent work on privacy-preserving machine learning has considered how datamin-
ing competitions such as Kaggle could potentially be “hacked”, either intentionally
or inadvertently, by using information from an oracle that reports a classifier’s
accuracy on the test set (Blum and Hardt, 2015; Hardt and Ullman, 2014; Zheng,
2015; Whitehill, 2016). For binary classification tasks in particular, one of the most
common accuracy metrics is the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC), and in this
paper we explore the mathematical structure of how the AUC is computed from
an n-vector of real-valued “guesses” with respect to the ground-truth labels. We
show how knowledge of a classifier’s AUC on the test set can constrain the set of
possible ground-truth labelings, and we derive an algorithm both to compute the
exact number of such labelings and to enumerate efficiently over them. Finally, we
provide empirical evidence that, surprisingly, the number of compatible labelings
can actually decrease as n grows, until a test set-dependent threshold is reached.
1 Introduction and Related Work
Datamining contests such as Kaggle and KDDCup can accelerate progress in many application
domains by providing standardized datasets and a fair basis of comparing multiple algorithmic
approaches. However, their utility will diminish if the integrity of leaderboard rankings is called
into question due to either intentional or accidental overfitting to the test data. Recent research on
privacy-preserving machine learning (Whitehill, 2016; Blum and Hardt, 2015; Zheng, 2015) has
shown how information on the accuracy of a contestant’s guesses, returned to the contestant by an
oracle, can divulge information about the test data’s true labels. Such oracles are often provided by
the organizers of the competition themselves. For example, in the 2017 Intel & MobileODT Cervical
Cancer Screening competition1 hosted by Kaggle, every contestant can submit her/his guesses up to
5 times per day, and for each submission the oracle returns the log-loss of the guesses with respect
to the ground-truth values of the entire 512-element test set. The contestant can use the accuracy
information to improve (hopefully) the classifier design and then re-submit.
AUC: For binary classification problems, one of the most commonly used accuracy metrics is the Area
Under the Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve (AUC). In contrast to other accuracy metrics
such as log-loss and 0/1 loss, which can be computed as the sum of example-wise losses over each
example in the test set, the AUC statistic is computed over all possible pairs of test examples, such
that each pair contains one example from each class. In a recent paper, Whitehill (2016) showed that
an oracle that provides contestants with information on the AUC of their guesses can inadvertently
divulge information on the ground-truth labels of the test examples. As a concrete example, suppose
that a tiny test set contains just 4 examples; a contestant’s real-valued guesses for these labels is
yˆ = (0.2, 0.5, 0.9, 0.1); and an oracle informs the contestant that her/his guesses have achieved
an AUC of exactly 0.75 = 3/4. How does this information constrain the set of possible binary
ground-truth vectors for the test set? In this example, it turns out that there is exactly one possible
ground-truth vector – namely y = (1, 0, 1, 0) – for which the AUC of the contestant’s guesses is
exactly 0.75. Hence, based on a single oracle query, the contestant has managed to deduce the
test labels with complete certainty. This simple example raises more general questions: For a test
set with n examples and a fixed AUC of c = p/q (where p, q ∈ Z), how many compatible binary
1 https://www.kaggle.com/c/intel-mobileodt-cervical-cancer-screening
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ground-truth vectors are there? Does this number grow monotonically in n, or might there exist
some “pathological” combinations of the number of test examples n, number of positively labeled
examples n1, and the contestant’s AUC c, such that this number is small? If the number is small, can
the solution candidates be enumerated efficiently? This paper explores these questions in some detail.
Related work: Over the past few years there has been growing theoretical and practical interest in
the statistical validity of scientific results that are obtained from adaptive data analyses, in which
the results of one experiment inform the design of the next (Dwork et al., 2015; Hardt and Ullman,
2014). For the particular application of datamining contests – in which contestants can submit their
guesses to an oracle, receive information on their accuracy, revise their guesses, and resubmit – a
potential danger is that the rankings and associated accuracy statistics of different contestants may be
unreliable. Therefore, the design of algorithms to generate contest leaderboards that are robust to
“hacking”, whether intentional as part of an attack or inadvertently due to adaptive overfitting, has
begun to generate significant research interest (Blum and Hardt, 2015; Zheng, 2015). In particular,
Blum and Hardt (2015) proposed an algorithm (“Ladder”) that can reliably estimate the accuracy of a
contestant’s classifier on the true test data distribution, even when the classifier has been adaptively
optimized based on the output of an oracle on the empirical test distribution.
While the availability of an oracle in datamining contests presents potential problems, it is also useful
for helping contestants to focus their efforts on more promising algorithmic approaches. Our research
is thus related to privacy-preserving machine learning and differential privacy (e.g., Dwork (2011);
Chaudhuri and Monteleoni (2009); Blum, Ligett, and Roth (2013)), which are concerned with how to
provide useful aggregate statistics without disclosing private information about particular examples in
the dataset. The AUC statistic, in particular, has been investigated in the context of privacy: Stoddard,
Chen, and Machanavajjhala (2014) proposed an algorithm for computing “private ROC” curves and
associated AUC statistics. Matthews and Harel (2013) showed how an attacker who already knows
most of the test labels can estimate the remaining labels if he/she gains access to an empirical ROC
curve, i.e., a set of classifier thresholds and corresponding true positive and false positive rates.
The prior work most similar to ours is by Whitehill (2016). They showed a weak form of lower
bound on the number of possible binary ground-truth vectors y ∈ {0, 1}n for which the contestant’s
guesses yˆ achieve any fixed AUC c. Specifically, for every AUC value c = p/q ∈ (0, 1), there
exists an infinite sequence of dataset sizes (n = 4q, 8q, 12q, . . .) such that the number of satisfying
ground-truth vectors y ∈ {0, 1}n grows exponentially in n. However, this result does not preclude
the possibility that there might be certain pathological cases – combinations of p, q, n0, and n1 – for
which the number of satisfying ground-truth vectors is actually much smaller. Conceivably, there
might be values of n that lie between integer multiples of 4q for which the number of satisfying
solutions is small. Moreover, the lower bound in Whitehill (2016) applies only to datasets that contain
at least 4q examples and says nothing about smaller (but possibly still substantial) datasets.
Contributions: The novel contributions of our paper are the following: (1) We derive an algorithm
to compute the exact number of n-dimensional binary ground-truth vectors for which a contestant’s
real-valued vector of guesses achieves a fixed AUC, along with an algorithm to efficiently generate
all such vectors. (2) We show that the number of distinct binary ground-truth vectors, in which n1
entries are 1, and for which a contestant’s guesses achieve a fixed AUC, is equal to the number of
elements in a truncated n1-dimensional discrete simplex (i.e., a subset of ∆n1d ). (3) We provide
empirical evidence that the number of satisfying binary ground-truth vectors can actually decrease
with increasing n, until a test set-dependent threshold is reached.
2 Notation and Assumptions
Let y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ {0, 1}n be the ground-truth binary labels of n test examples, and let
yˆ = (yˆ1, . . . , yˆn) ∈ Rn be the contestant’s real-valued guesses. Let L1(y) = {i : yi = 1} and
L0(y) = {i : yi = 0} represent the index sets of the examples that are labeled 1 and 0, respectively.
Similarly define n1(y) = |L1(y)| and n0(y) = |L0(y)| to be the number of examples labeled 1 and
0 in y, respectively. For brevity, we sometimes write simply n1, n0, L0, or L1 if the argument to
these functions is clear from the context.
We assume that the contestant’s guesses yˆ1, . . . , yˆn are all distinct (i.e., yˆi = yˆj ⇐⇒ i = j). In
machine learning applications where classifiers analyze high-dimensional, real-valued feature vectors,
this is common.
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Importantly, but without loss of generality, we assume that the test examples are ordered according to
yˆ1, . . . , yˆn, i.e., yˆi > yˆj ⇐⇒ i > j. This significantly simplifies the notation.
Finally, we assume that the oracle provides the contestant with perfect knowledge of the AUC
c = p/q, where p/q is a reduced fraction (i.e., the greatest common factor of p and q 1) on the entire
test set, and that the contestant knows both p and q.
3 AUC Accuracy Metric
The AUC has two mathematically equivalent definitions (Tyler and Chen, 2000; Agarwal et al., 2005):
(1) the AUC is the Area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, which plots
the true positive rate against the false positive rate of a classifier on some test set. The ROC thus
characterizes the performance of the classifier over all possible thresholds on its real-valued output,
and the AUC is the integral of the ROC over all possible false positive rates in the interval [0, 1].
(2) The AUC represents the fraction of pairs of test examples – one labeled 1 and one labeled 0 –
in which the classifier can correctly identify the positively labeled example based on the classifier
output. Specifically, since we assume that all of the contestant’s guesses are distinct, then the AUC
can be computed as:
AUC(y, yˆ) =
1
n0n1
∑
i∈L0
∑
j∈L1
I[yˆi < yˆj ] (1)
Equivalently, we can define the AUC in terms of the number of misclassified pairs h:
AUC(y, yˆ) = 1− h(y, yˆ)
n0n1
where
h(y, yˆ) =
∑
i∈L0
∑
j∈L1
I[yˆi > yˆj ]
As is evident in Eq. 1, all that matters to the AUC is the relative ordering of the yˆi, not their exact
values. Also, if all examples belong to the same class and either n1 = 0 or n0 = 0, then the AUC
is undefined. Finally, the AUC is a rational number because it can be written as the fraction of two
integers p and q, where q must divide n0n1.
Since we assume (without loss of generality) that the contestant’s guesses are ordered such that
yˆi < yˆj ⇐⇒ i < j, then we can simplify the definition of h to be:
h(y, yˆ) =
∑
i∈L0
∑
j∈L1
I[i > j] (2)
4 Computing the Exact Number of Binary Labelings for which AUC=c
In this paper, we are interested in determining the number of unique binary vectors y ∈ {0, 1}n such
that the contestant’s guesses yˆ ∈ Rn achieve a fixed AUC of c. The bulk of the effort is to derive a
recursive formula for the number of unique binary vectors with a fixed number n1 of 1s that give the
desired AUC value.
Intuition: Given a real-valued vector yˆ representing the contestant’s guesses and a corresponding
binary vector y representing the ground-truth test labels, the number h(y, yˆ) of misclassified pairs
of examples (such that each pair contains one example from each class) can be increased by 1 by
“left-swapping” any occurrence of 1 in y (at index j′) with a 0 that occurs immediately to the left
of it (i.e., at index j′ − 1) – see Figure 1. To generate a vector y such that h(y, yˆ) = d for any
desired d ∈ {0, . . . , q}, we start with a vector r in “right-most configuration” – i.e., where all the 0s
occur to the left of all the 1s – because (as we will show) h(r, yˆ) = 0. We then apply a sequence of
multiple left-swaps to each of the 1s in r, and count the number of ways of doing so such that the total
number is d. Because we want to determine the number of unique vectors y such that h(y, yˆ) = d,
we restrict the numbers s1, . . . , sn1 of left-swaps applied to the n1 different 1s in r so that si ≥ sj
for all i < j. This results in a proof that the number of possible ground-truth binary labelings, for
any given value of n1 and for which a given vector of guesses misclassifies d pairs of examples, is
equal to the number of points in a n1-dimensional discrete simplex ∆n1d that has been truncated by
the additional constraint that n0 ≥ s1 ≥ . . . ≥ sn1 .
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1 2 3 4 i′=5 j′=6 7 8 9 10
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
Guess ŷ
Label y
Label z
h(y, ŷ)=4
h(z, ŷ)=5
Figure 1: Illustration of how performing a left-swap on binary vector y at index j′ yields a new
vector z such that the number of misclassified pairs h(z, yˆ) is one more than h(y, yˆ). Specifically, yˆ
misclassifies pairs (3, 4), (3, 5), (3, 7), and (6, 7) w.r.t. to y, since for each such pair (i, j), yˆi < yˆj
but yi > yj . In contrast, yˆ misclassifies (3, 4), (3, 6), (3, 7), (5, 6), and (5, 7) w.r.t. to z.
To get started, we first define “left-swap” and “right-most configuration” more precisely:
Definition 1. For any y ∈ {0, 1}n and i ∈ {2, . . . , n} where yi = 1 and yi−1 = 0, define the
(partial) function σ : {0, 1}n × Z+ → {0, 1}n such that σ(y, i) = (y1, . . . , yi, yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yn).
Function σ is said to perform a left-swap on y from index i.
Definition 2. For any y ∈ {0, 1}n, i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, and k < i where yi = 1 and yi−1 = . . . =
yi−k = 0, define the (partial) function ρ : {0, 1}n × Z+ × Z+ → {0, 1}n, where
ρ(y, i, k) =

σ(y, i) for k = 1
σ(. . . (σ(σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
(y, i), i− 1), . . .), i− (k − 1)) for k > 1
Function ρ is said to perform k consecutive left-swaps on y from index i.
Example 1. Let y = (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) ∈ {0, 1}5. Then σ(y, 4) = (y1, y2, y4, y3, y5) and
ρ(y, 4, 3) = (y4, y1, y2, y3, y5).
Definition 3. Let y be a vector of n binary labels such that n1 entries are 1. Let L1(y) =
{p1, . . . , pn1}, ordered such that pi < pj ⇐⇒ i < j, be the indices of the 1s in the vector.
Then we say y is in a right-most configuration iff pi = n− n1 + i for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n1}.
Proposition 1. Let r = (r1, . . . , rn) be a binary vector of length n in right-most configuration such
that n1 entries are 1. Let yˆ = (yˆ1, . . . , yˆn) be a vector of n real-valued guesses, ordered such that
yˆi < yˆj ⇐⇒ i < j. Then h(r, yˆ) = 0.
Proof. Since r is in right-most configuration, it is clear that the right-hand side of
h(r, yˆ) =
∑
i∈L0(r)
∑
j∈L1(r)
I[i > j]
sums to 0.
Proposition 2. Let y be a vector of n binary labels, and let z = σ(y, j′) be another vector of binary
labels that is produced by a single left-swap of y at index j′ ∈ {2, . . . , n}, where yj′ = 1 and yi′ = 0,
and i′ = j′−1. Let yˆ be a vector of real-valued guesses. Then the number of pairs misclassified by yˆ
w.r.t. z is one more than the number of pairs misclassified by yˆ w.r.t. y – i.e., h(z, yˆ) = h(y, yˆ) + 1.
Proof. To shorten the notation, let L0 = L0(y),L1 = L1(y), and let L˜0 = L0(z), L˜1 = L1(z). We
can split the summation in Equation 2 into four sets of pairs (see Figure 1): (a) those involving neither
i′ nor j′; (b) those involving j′ but not i′; (c) those involving i′ but not j′; and (d) the single pair
involving both i′ and j′. By grouping the pairs this way, we obtain:
h(z, yˆ)
=
 ∑
i∈
L˜0\{j′}
∑
j∈
L˜1\{i′}
I[i > j]
+
 ∑
i∈
L˜0\{j′}
I[i > i′]
+
 ∑
j∈
L˜1\{i′}
I[j′ > j]
+ I[j′ > i′]
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Notice that L˜0 = (L0(y) \ {i′}) ∪ {j′}, and hence L0(y) \ {i′} = L˜0(z) \ {j′}. Similarly,
L˜1 \ {i′} = L1 \ {j′}. Then we have:
h(z, yˆ) =
∑
i∈
L0\{i′}
∑
j∈
L1\{j′}
I[i > j] +
∑
i∈
L0\{i′}
I[i > i′] +
∑
j∈
L1\{j′}
I[j′ > j] + I[j′ > i′]
Since i′ + 1 = j′, then there cannot exist any index i ∈ L0 \ {i′} whose value is “between” i′ and j′;
in other words, i > i′ ⇐⇒ i > j′ for every i ∈ L0 \ {i′}. Similarly, j′ > j ⇐⇒ i′ > j for every
j ∈ L1 \ {j′}. Hence:
h(z, yˆ) =
∑
i∈
L0\{i′}
∑
j∈
L1\{j′}
I[i > j] +
∑
i∈
L0\{i′}
I[i > j′] +
∑
j∈
L1\{j′}
I[i′ > j] + I[j′ > i′]
Finally, since I[j′ > i′] = 1 and I[i′ < j′] = 0, then:
h(z, yˆ) =
∑
i∈
L0\{i′}
∑
j∈
L1\{j′}
I[i > j] +
∑
i∈
L0\{i′}
I[i > j′] +
∑
j∈
L1\{j′}
I[i′ > j] + I[i′ > j′] + 1
= h(y, yˆ) + 1
Proposition 3. Suppose a dataset contains n examples, of which n1 are labeled 1 and n0 = n− n1
are labeled 0. Let Yn1 = {y ∈ {0, 1}n :
∑
i yi = n1}, and let Sn1 = {(s1, . . . , sn1) ∈ Zn1 : n0 ≥
s1 ≥ . . . ≥ sn1 ≥ 0}. Then Yn1 and Sn1 are in 1-to-1 correspondence.
Proof. Every binary vector y ∈ Yn1 of length n, of which n1 entries are 1, can be described by
a unique vector of integers in the set Pn1 = {(p1, . . . , pn1) ∈ Z+ : 1 ≤ p1 < . . . < pn1 ≤ n}
specifying the indices of the 1s in y in increasing order. In particular, Yn1 and Pn1 are in 1-to-1
correspondence with a bijection fp : Yn1 → Pn1 . Hence, if we can show a bijection fs : Pn1 → Sn1 ,
then we can compose fs with fp to yield a new function f : Yn1 → Sn1 ; since the composition of
two bijections is bijective, then f will be bijective.
We can construct such an fs as follows:
fs(p1, . . . , pn1) = (s1, . . . , sn1) where si = n− n1 + i− pi
We must first show that (s1, . . . , sn1) = fs(p1, . . . , pn1) ∈ Sn1 for every (p1, . . . , pn1) ∈ Pn1 ; in
particular, we must show that n0 ≥ s1 ≥ . . . ≥ sn1 ≥ 0. Since every pi is an integer, we have that
pj − pi ≥ j − i for every j > i. Hence:
n− n1 + pj − pi ≥ n− n1 + j − i
We then add i to and subtract pj from both sides to obtain:
n− n1 + i− pi ≥ n− n1 + j − pj
si ≥ sj ∀j > i
The two boundary cases are sn1 :
sn1 = n− n1 + n1 − pn1 = n− pn1 ≥ 0
and s1:
s1 = n− n1 + 1− p1 = n0 + 1− p1 ≤ n0
fs is 1-to-1: Suppose (s1, . . . , sn1) = fs(p1, . . . , pn1) and (s′1, . . . , s′n1) = fs(p
′
1, . . . , p
′
n1), and
suppose si = s′i for each i. Then:
n− n1 + i− pi = n− n1 + i− p′i (3)
⇐⇒ (4)
pi = p
′
i (5)
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0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
r
y
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 2: Illustration of how any binary vector y with n1 1s can be produced by repeatedly left-
swapping the 1’s in a right-most binary vector r. In the example above, left-swaps are indicated with
blue arrows, with s1 = 3, s2 = 1, and s3 = s4 = s5 = 0.
for each i.
fs is onto: For every (s1, . . . , sn1) ∈ Sn1 , we can find (p1, . . . , pn1) such that fs(p1, . . . , pn1) =
(s1, . . . , sn1) by setting pi = n− n1 + i− si for each i. It only remains to be shown that 1 ≤ p1 <
. . . < pn1 ≤ n: For any j > i,
pj − pi = j − i+ si − sj
Since si ≥ sj (by definition of Sn1 ), we have:
pj − pi ≥ j − i
> 0
and hence pj > pi. Moreover,
p1 = n− n1 + 1− s1
≥ n− n1 + 1− n0
≥ 1
and
pn1 = n− n1 + n1 − sn1
≤ n
Theorem 1. Suppose a dataset contains n examples, of which n1 are labeled 1 and n0 are labeled
0. Let Y(d)n1 = {y ∈ {0, 1}n :
∑
i yi = n1 ∧ h(y, yˆ) = d}, and let S(d)n1 = {(s1, . . . , sn1) ∈ Zn1 :
n0 ≥ s1 ≥ . . . ≥ sn1 ≥ 0 ∧
∑
i si = d}. Then Y(d)n1 and S(d)n1 are in 1-to-1 correspondence.
Proof. Since Y(d)n1 ⊂ Yn1 and S(d)n1 ⊂ Sn1 , and since Yn1 and Sn1 are in 1-to-1 correspondence with
bijection f (from Proposition 3) then we must show only that the image of Y(d)n1 through f is S(d)n1 .
Suppose that (s1, . . . , sn1) = f(y) for some y ∈ Y(d)n1 . Then we can write y as
y = ρ(ρ(. . . (ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
(r, n− n1 + 1, s1), n− n1 + 2, s2) . . .), n, sn1)
In other words, y ∈ Y(d)n1 can be obtained from r (a binary vector of length n, such that n1 elements
are labeled 1, in right-most configuration) by performing a sequence of consecutive left-swaps on
the 1s in r. To see this, observe that the first 1 in r is always immediately preceded by n0 0s; hence,
we can perform s1 ≤ n0 consecutive left-swaps on r from index n− n1 + 1. (See Figure 2 for an
illustration.) Moreover, after performing these consecutive left-swaps, then the second 1 in r will
be immediately preceded by s1 0s; hence, we can perform s2 ≤ s1 consecutive left-swaps on r
from index n− n1 + 2. After performing these consecutive left-swaps, then the third 1 in r will be
immediately preceded by s2 0s; and so on. After performing the consecutive left-swaps for each of
the 1s in r, then the position of the ith 1 in the resulting vector is n− n1 + i− si = pi for each i, as
desired.
Next, recall that, by Proposition 1, h(r, yˆ) = 0. Moreover, by Proposition 2, each left-swap
increases the value of h by 1; hence, applying ρ to perform si consecutive left-swaps increases
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the value of h by si. Summing over all 1s results in a total of
∑n1
i=1 si misclassified pairs, i.e.,
h(y, yˆ) =
∑n1
i=1 si. But since y ∈ Y(d)n1 , we already know that h(y, yˆ) = d. Therefore,
∑
i si = d,
and hence (s1, . . . , sn1) ∈ Y(d)n1 .
Interestingly, the set S(d)n1 is a discrete n1-dimensional simplex ∆n1d that has been truncated by the
additional constraint that n0 ≥ s1 ≥ . . . ≥ sn1 .
4.1 Summing over all possible n1
Based on Theorem 1, we can compute the number, v(n0, n1, d), of binary vectors of length n =
n0 + n1, such that n1 of the entries are labeled 1 and for which h(y, yˆ) = d. Recall that the
AUC can be computed by dividing the number d of misclassified pairs by the total number of
example-pairs n0n1. Hence, to compute the total number, w(n, c), of binary vectors of length n for
which AUC(y, yˆ) = c, we must first determine the set N1 of possible values for n1, and then sum
v(n0, n1, d) over every value in N1 and the corresponding value d.
Suppose that the oracle reports an AUC of c = p/q, where p/q is a reduced fraction, Since c
represents the fraction of all pairs of examples – one from each class – that are classified by the
contestant’s guesses correctly, then q must divide the total number (n0n1) of pairs in the test set.
Hence:
N1 = {n1 : (0 < n1 < n) ∧ (q | (n− n1)n1)}
Since it is possible that q < n0n1, we must scale (q − p) by n0n1/q to determine the actual number
of misclassified pairs d. In particular, we define
d(n1) = (q − p)n0n1/q = (q − p)(n− n1)n1/q
Based on N1 and m, we can finally compute:
w(n, c) =
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃
n1∈N1
S(d(n1))n1
∣∣∣∣∣ = ∑
n1∈N1
v(n− n1, n1, d(n1)) since the S(d(n1))n1 are disjoint.
5 Recursion Relation
We can derive a recursion relation for v(n0, n1, d) as follows: Given any binary vector r of length
n, with n1 1s, in right-most configuration, we can apply k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,min(d, n0)} left-swaps on r
from index n− n1 + 1 (i.e., from the left-most 1) to yield y = ρ(r, n− n1 + 1, k). Then the vector
(yn−n1−k+2, yn−n1−k+3, yn−n1−k+4, . . . , yn) (i.e., the last n1 − 1 + k elements of y) consists of k
0s followed by (n1 − 1) 1s; in other words, it is in right-most configuration. Thus, by iterating over
all possible k and computing for each choice how many more left-swaps are necessary to reach a
total of d, we can define v recursively:
v(n0, n1, d) =
min(d,n0)∑
k=0
v(k, n1 − 1, d− k)
with initial conditions:
v(n0, n1, 0) = 1 ∀n0 ≥ 0, n1 ≥ 0
v(0, n1, d) = 0 ∀n1 ≥ 0, d > 0
v(n0, 0, d) = 0 ∀n0 ≥ 0, d > 0
Dynamic programming using a three-dimensional memoization table can be used to compute v in
time O(n0n1d). Moreover, the recursive algorithm above can also be used constructively (though
with large space costs) to compute the set of all binary vectors y of length n, of which n1 are 1,
such that h(y, yˆ) = d for any d; conceivably, this could be useful for performing some kind of
attack that uses the set of all compatible binary ground-truth vectors to improve the contestant’s
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accuracy (Whitehill, 2016). In order to apply this construction, the test examples must first be sorted
in increasing value of the contestant’s guesses; the constructive algorithm is then applied to generate
all possible y; and then the components of each of the possible binary vectors must be reordered to
recover the original order of the test examples.
6 Growth of w(n, c) in n for fixed c
Whitehill (2016) showed that, for every fixed rational c = p/q ∈ (0, 1), the number of possible
binary ground-truth vectors for which the contestant’s guesses achieve AUC of exactly c, grows
exponentially in n. However, their result applies only to datasets that are at least n = 4q in size.
What can happen for smaller n?
Using the recursive formula from Section 5, we found empirical evidence thatw(n, c) may actually be
(initially) monotonically decreasing in n, until n reaches a threshold (specific to q) at which it begins
to increase again. As an example with p = 1387 and q = 1440 (and hence d = 1440− 1387 = 53),
we can compute the number of possible binary labelings that are compatible with an AUC of exactly
c = p/q = 1387/1440 (which is approximately 96.3%) as a function of n:
n N1 w(n, c)
76 {36, 40} 657488
77 {32, 45} 654344
78 {30, 48} 650822
84 {24, 60} 622952
92 {20, 72} 572728
98 {18, 80} 529382
106 {16, 90} 468686
Here, w(n, c) decreases steadily until n = 106. We conjecture that w(n, c) is monotonically non-
increasing in n for n ≤ min{n0 + n1 : n0n1 = 2q}, for every fixed c.
While the number of satisfying solutions in this example for n = 106 is still in the hundreds of
thousands, it is easily small enough to allow each possibility to be considered individually, e.g., as
part of some algorithmic attack to maximize performance within a datamining competition (Whitehill,
2016). Furthermore, we note that test sets on the order of hundreds of examples are not uncommon –
the 2017 Intel & MobileODT Cervical Cancer Screening is one example.
7 Summary & Future Work
We have investigated the mathematical structure of how the Area Under the Receiver Operating
Characteristics Curve (AUC) accuracy metric is computed from the binary vector of ground-truth
labels and a real-valued vector of guesses. In particular, we derived an efficient recursive algorithm
with which to count the exact number of binary vectors for which the AUC of a fixed vector of
guesses is some value c; we also derived a constructive algorithm with which to enumerate all such
binary vectors.
In future work it would be interesting to examine whether and how knowledge of the possible ground-
truth labelings could be exploited to improve an existing vector of guesses; a simple mechanism
was proposed by Whitehill (2016), but it is practical only for tiny datasets. In addition, it would be
useful to explore how multiple subsequent oracle queries might be used to prune the set of possible
ground-truth labelings more rapidly.
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